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INTRODUCTION

In enacting its new Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP")
statute,1 the Washington legislature has broken new ground
with a unique approach to dealing with a small group of
extremely violent sex offenders. This novel statute has gener* Justice Joseph Weintraub Professor of Law Emeritus, Rutgers Law School,
Newark, and Associate, Institute for Health, Health Care Policy, and Aging Research,
Rutgers University.
1. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.09 (Supp. 1990-91).
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ated great controversy in Washington State and has also provoked national discussion among those who are concerned with
the punishment and treatment of particularly violent sex
offenders. If declared constitutional by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the Washington enactment may have influence far
beyond its state of origin. Yet, it is important to keep in mind
that the legislation discussed here was not intended to address
the state's entire sex offender problem. The Washington legislature has also enacted a comprehensive approach to sex
offenders, involving more severe criminal penalties for sex
offenses. The SVP legislation discussed here applies only to a
very small segment, albeit a critical one, of the entire sex
offender population.
Sex offender legislation that provides in general for civil
commitment and treatment in lieu of punishment is not new to
American law. Such legislatively mandated programs have2
been in existence in this country for at least sixty-five years;
until recently the state of Washington had such a "sexual psychopath" statute, which has since been, in effect, terminated.'
The novelty of the new statute is that it does not substitute treatment for punishment but rather, for a small and
highly selected number of offenders, mandates civil commitment for confinement and treatment after punishment has
been completed. This approach raises new and perplexing
legal questions.
The new statute responds to the long-existing but previously unsolved problem of what to do about sex offenders
whose prison terms are expiring, yet who are regarded as still
extremely dangerous. The statute designates members of this
very small cohort as "violent sexual predators," who have been
convicted of violent sexual crimes,4 and who at the time of
2. SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 739-40 (3d
ed. 1985).
3. In 1984, the Washington legislature limited its sexual psychopath statute to sex
offenses committed before July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989), repealed
prospectively by 1984 Wash. Laws ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005

(1989)).
4. Violent sexual crimes are designated as first degree rape, second degree rape by

forcible compulsion, first and second degree rape of a child, first and second degree
statutory rape, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion or against a child under

fourteen, incest against a child under fourteen, and first and second degree child
molestation.

Also included are certain felony and federal or other-state convictions comparable
to these. In addition, certain sexually motivated crimes are included: first and second
degree murder; first and second degree assault; first and second degree kidnapping;
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their pending release from prison or other discharge, suffer
from a mental condition that causes them5 to be likely to continue to engage in acts of sexual violence. The term "predator"
refers primarily to acts with strangers,6 thus generally excluding acts of incest.
A brief history of the events that preceded enactment of
the legislation will explain why it came into being and what
the intention of the legislature was in enacting it.7 As is often
the case with legislation dealing with the dangerous mentally
disordered, and especially in the case of sex offender legislation, the immediate genesis of the legislation was a shocking
crime. On May 21, 1989, a mentally retarded sex offender, Earl
Shriner, raped, stabbed, and sexually mutilated a seven-yearold boy. Shriner had a twenty-five year history of criminal
assaults, including murders against children, and had been
released from prison two years earlier, where he had served a
ten-year term for two violent sexual crimes. This horrible
event caused an enormous public outcry. What was regarded
as particularly outrageous was the revelation that at the time
Shriner was about to be discharged from prison two years earlier, some predicted that he was still very dangerous. Earlier
efforts to have him civilly committed and confined immediately on termination of his prison sentence were to no avail.
But civil commitment was denied by a judge, in part because it
could not be shown that Shriner had committed a "recent
overt act," a showing required by Washington's civil commitment statute.8 Because Shriner had been in prison for ten
years and his previous criminal acts had been against children,
he had had no opportunity to commit such a recent overt act.
Realization dawned on lawmakers and other legal experts
that the criminal justice and civil commitment systems had
failed in the Shriner case, if the release into society of a prefirst degree burglary; residential burglary; unlawful imprisonment; and attempts,
criminal solicitations, or criminal conspiracies to commit any of those felonies. WASH.
REV. CODE § 71.09.020(4) (Supp. 1990-91). The statute also applies to offenders who
have been "charged" with such crimes but who have not been convicted, either
because they were acquitted by reason of insanity or found unfit to stand trial and
never tried. Id. § 71.09.020(1).
5. Id.
6. Id. § 71.09.020(3).
7. A more complete account is presented in David Boerner, Confronting Violence:
In the Act and in the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 525 (1992).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.020(3) (1975), as interpreted in In re Harris, 98 Wash.
2d 276, 284, 654 P.2d 109, 113 (1982).
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dictably dangerous person despite efforts to prevent it could be
regarded as a failure. That it was a failure has been agreed
upon by virtually everyone concerned. What is not agreed
upon is the validity of the civil commitment approach taken by
the Washington legislature to rectify one aspect of that failure.
The fact that the new legislation followed hard upon a
shocking event that resulted in great public outcry should not
be taken as a per se criticism of the legislation. Shocking
events can generate beneficial responses, not only hysterical,
ill thought-out ones. The legislation must be evaluated on its
merits, not on its origin as a response to a horrible crime.
What problems did the legislation intend to address? The
first was that previous sentencing legislation and practices
were now perceived as having been far too lenient, as a result
of which a number of extremely dangerous sex offenders, serving relatively short terms in prison, were eligible for release
from prison to society despite their continued dangerousness.9
This problem could be rectified prospectively by ensuring less
lenient sentences in the future for sex offenders believed to be
especially dangerous. But the prospective approach would not
protect society from sex offenders who already had been convicted and sentenced and whose prison terms would expire
while they were still regarded as dangerous.
Second, it was recognized that existing civil commitment
legislation in Washington, designed to apply to an entirely different cohort of mentally disordered persons, could not be used
to "take up the slack" by providing for the further confinement of dangerous sex offenders. 10 The "recent overt act"
requirement of that statute could not be satisfied because
imprisoned sex offenders have little or no opportunity to commit such acts. Moreover, the legislation had not been designed
with sex offenders in mind and was not suitable for their
unique problems.
Third, occasions might arise where new evidence of
extreme dangerousness, in the form of letters, diaries, and
statements to friends, fellow prisoners, psychiatrists, and
9. See Boerner, supra note 7.
10. The failure of the civil commitment system to provide for the involuntary
commitment of violent sex offenders was described by the Task Force as one of several
"gaps in our law and administrative structures [that) allow the release of known
dangerous offenders who are highly likely to commit very serious crimes."
GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION, DEP'T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH
SERVICES, FINAL REPORT 11-20 to -21 (1989).
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others would reveal, after sentencing and during imprisonment, an extent of dangerousness that had previously not been
known, understood, or appreciated."
With these limitations of the existing criminal and civil
systems in mind, the legislature decided that a new form of
involuntary civil commitment should be tailored specifically to
apply to that "small but extremely dangerous"1 2 group of violent sex offenders whose sentences under the pre-existing system were now acknowledged as inadequate in terms of societal
safety.
The SVP legislation that emerged from that policy decision has now been attacked as unconstitutional. Litigation is
now before the Washington Supreme Court," with a likelihood
that, whatever the outcome there, the case will ultimately be
presented to the U.S. Supreme Court.
This Article will address not only the federal constitutionality of the SVP statute, but also its fairness or morality, on
the assumption that the Constitution, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, does not always address the fairness issue.
While both of these concerns necessarily and inevitably involve
the wisdom or sound policy of the approach taken in this statute, a fuller discussion of that dimension is left to Professor
David Boerner, who in another Article1 4 in this Symposium
discusses why the treatment program option seemed to be the
wisest and most desirable policy choice among a number of
alternative courses of action.
This Article will address four major substantive constitutional and moral challenges to the statute. The first is that the
statute provides for unacceptable preventive detention contrary to American tradition and law. The second is that the
terminology used to identify the mental condition of sexually
violent predators is vague and meaningless, resulting in inaccurate and unfair applications and lacking in uniformity. The
third objection is that the treatment program necessarily relies
on a false assumption that efficacious treatment is available
11. Some time before Earl Shriner was due to be discharged from prison it was
learned that he "had hatched elaborate plans to maim or kill youngsters while waiting
out the final months of his prison sentence .... He had lists of apparatus he might
need in that regard." Boerner, supra note 7, at 527.
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (Supp. 1990-91).
13. In re Young, 804 P.2d 1261 (Wash. 1991) (No. 57837-1) (granting review of
personal restraint petitions by Andre Brigham Young and Vance Cunningham).
14. See Boerner, supra note 7.
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and argues that without efficacious treatment the statute must
fail. Fourth, the confinement involved, which theoretically
could last a lifetime, is based on predictions of future dangerousness that are highly inaccurate, resulting in the inappropriate and unjust confinement of many nondangerous persons.
This last criticism in particular is subjected to a careful analysis in Sections IV and V of this Article, in which much new
data and an entirely new analysis of that data are presented.
II.

SELECTING OFFENDERS FOR COMMITMENT

Before moving to a discussion of these four challenges, it is
first necessary to examine the selection process for commitment. In the last two years in which the SVP statute has been
operative, only a very small number of violent sexual
predators (nine) have been selected for civil commitment from
a very large cohort of sex offenders (approximately 500 each
year) who were about to be released from prison. How were
those selections made?
The selection process begins with an evaluation by Department of Corrections staff of all offenders about to be released.
From this large group, a "first cut" is referred by Corrections
staff to the End of Sentence Review Referral Subcommittee
("ESRRS"), an interagency group with members from CorrecSentions, Social and Health Services, and the Indeterminate
15
tence Review Board, formerly the Parole Board.
The function of ESRRS is to select from this larger group
a much smaller group of high risk cases that it will refer to the
county prosecutors. The prosecutors decide which offenders
against whom they will file a petition.'6
In deciding which offenders are to be referred to the prosecutors, ESRRS examines and considers a substantial amount
of data for each. This data includes the following: (1) records
of conviction of sexually violent crimes; (2) records of evaluation and/or treatment such as psychological or psychiatric
tests, group notes, autobiographical notes, progress notes,
psycho-social reports and other material gathered while the
offender was in custody; (3) presentence reports and an endof-sentence review report and the data on which the report
15. Washington Dep't of Corrections, Division of Prisons, Division Directive:
Referring Select Offenders to the End of Sentence Review Committee (ESRC) (DOP
350.500) (May 28, 1991).
16. Id.
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was based; (4) the offender's version of his offenses, including
records of interviews with him; (5) a current record of all
prior arrests and convictions together with police reports on
them; (6) institutional records describing the offender's behavior while he was in custody in any institution; and (7) in some
cases, a current mental health evaluation.' 7
The prosecutor to whom an offender is referred obtains an
expert opinion on whether the offender suffers from a mental
abnormality or personality disorder and whether he is likely to
engage in future predatory acts of sexual violence. The prosecutor also examines reports on the offender's history, statements from material witnesses who were involved in his
sexually violent offenses, and statements from witnesses who
in the institutions
provided treatment or supervisory services
8
confinement.'
in
was
offender
where the
Filing standards issued by the Washington Attorney General, intended either as an "addition to or in clarification of the
statutory requirements," require a showing that the offender
"has a provable pattern of prior predatory acts."' 9 Thus,
although the statute contains no such criterion, the Attorney
General requires a showing of recidivism. Any declarations
made by the offender indicating an intent to commit future
predatory acts are considered in evaluating such a pattern.
The standards also require that a qualified mental health
professional find the statutorily requisite mental abnormality
or personality disorder that would make the offender likely to
engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. The offender
should not have been paroled by the Department of Corrections on his latest offense. The victim or the victim's family
should be consulted and agree to testify in commitment proceedings. Normally, commitment proceedings should not be
brought if the offender has been released from custody for a
"substantial period of time" and has not engaged in activity
indicating a continuation of violent sexual predatory behavior.
Finally, a petition should not be filed until "all other appropriate civil commitment and/or criminal proceedings have been
17. Letter from Jeanne Tweten, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, State of
Washington, Criminal Division, to Professor Alex Brooks (Apr. 7, 1992) (containing
final draft of Washington Attorney General's "Sexually Violent Predator Filing
Standards") (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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exhausted." 20
County prosecuting attorneys are encouraged to consult
with the State Prosecutors' Committee on Sexually Violent
Predators, which coordinates all prosecutorial actions under
the statute and advises about the appropriateness of filing a
petition. If a petition is filed, the offender is examined and
evaluated by the staff of the Special Commitment Center
("SCC"). The prosecutor must then reevaluate his petition in
light of the SCC report.2
In the six month period from July to December 1991, 250
sex offenders were about to be released. One hundred eightyfour high risk cases were referred to ESRRS, which then
referred only seventeen of these to various prosecutors.22
At the time of this writing, after a period of almost two
years since the statute has gone into effect, only nine offenders
have been committed, including Young and Cunningham, the
two petitioners in the litigation pending before the Washington
Supreme Court.23 Young was diagnosed as suffering from
"mixed personality disorder with primarily paranoid and antisocial features" that predisposed him "to commit serious, violent sexual acts against women. "24 He has been convicted of
six felony rapes, though he was at large for only eleven years
between the ages of twenty-one to forty-nine. Cunningham
committed four felony assaults, including completed and
uncompleted rapes, all before he reached the age of twentythree.
III.

PREVENTIVE DETENTION

A threshold charge against the statute is that it provides
for impermissible preventive detention, which, as used in this
context, is usually characterized as the confinement of a person to prevent him from engaging in future proscribed antisocial behavior. The ultimate specter is "pure" preventive
detention, the confinement of a person who has never committed an offense, but who is predicted to do so, especially where
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Memorandum from R. Peggy Smith, Dep't of Corrections, to Professor Alex
Brooks (Apr. 6, 1992) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law Review).

23. In re Young, 804 P.2d 1261 (Wash. 1991).
24. Letter from Irwin S. Dreiblatt, Ph.D., to Tim Blood, Deputy Prosecuting
Attorney, King County (Oct. 6, 1990) (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law
Review).
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the prediction is highly speculative.2 5
The preventive detention of the SVP statute is not "pure"
because the statute applies only to those offenders who have
already been convicted of at least one crime of sexual violence,
and usually more than one. Thus, the preventive detention of
this statute is crime-related. A person who is sexually deviant
cannot be committed as a sexually violent predator, regardless
of the evidence of his sexual behavior, if he has never been
convicted of a crime of sexual violence as defined in the
statute.2 6
It may seem odd, at first blush, that the preventive detention argument is raised as an objection to a civil commitment
system. All existing civil commitment statutes in this country,
whose constitutionality is not in question for that reason, necessarily involve preventive detention. A major purpose of any
statute that provides for the confinement of mentally disordered and dangerous persons is to prevent them from engaging
in future behavior that would be harmful either to themselves
or to others. Successful treatment is another purpose of confinement, but not a necessary one, for untreatable patients are
not required to be discharged if they continue to be mentally
ill and dangerous. Courts have traditionally justified such preventive detention as an exercise of the State's police power or
its parens patriae power. No challenge to the State's exercise
of these powers of preventive detention has ever been
successful.
A particularly close parallel to the SVP statute can be
found in statutes that provide for the involuntary civil commitment of prisoners whose prison terms have expired but who
are regarded as mentally disordered and too dangerous to be
released to society. In fact, a significant part of the population
25. During World War II, American citizens of Japanese ancestry who had
committed no offense were "preventively" detained in "assembly centers" and

"relocation centers" to prevent deeply feared espionage and sabotage. Their detention
was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214

(1944). This was "pure" preventive detention, perhaps the only case of it in the history
of this country, but one that has since been severely condemned. See, e.g., MICHI
WEGLYN, YEARS OF INFAMY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA'S CONCENTRATION

CAMPS (1976).
26. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (1989) repealed prospectively by 1984 Wash.

Laws ch. 209 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 71.06.005 (1989)).

The Washington

Supreme Court ruled that the sexual psychopath statute requires rigorous procedural

safeguards but otherwise upheld its constitutional validity in State v. McCarter, 91
Wash. 2d 249, 257, 588 P.2d 745, 750 (1978).
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of most maximum security mental hospitals consists of patients
who have been committed following the completion of their
prison terms. The constitutional propriety of such commitments was implicitly approved by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Baxstrom v. Herold,2 7 which declared certain commitments
unconstitutional because of procedural infirmities, but not
because they were substantively improper.
Thus, there seems to be unchallenged precedent for the
imposition of involuntary civil commitment on mentally disordered and dangerous persons following the completion of their
prison sentences, although there has been no explicit Supreme
Court ruling to that effect. The likelihood that the present
U.S. Supreme Court would find otherwise seems remote.
Nevertheless, Washington's SVP statute is a civil commitment program with a difference. What fuels the debate over
the propriety of the SVP statute is that many critics see it as
providing additional punishment in the guise of a civil treatment program without typical criminal protections. Such critics see the statute as a stop gap measure for cases in which the
criminal justice system has failed to impose sufficient punishment or has imposed no punishment at all. Critics of the SVP
statute argue that if the criminal justice system has failed, it
should be rectified, but only prospectively, to ensure that violent sexual crimes are appropriately punished in the future.
Furthermore, they suggest that longer prison terms should be
provided for each crime and that a habitual offender approach
should be adopted that would require recidivists to serve particularly long terms.2"
27. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
28. A series of arguments urging the use of the criminal process instead of civil
commitment are presented in Brian G. Bodine, Comment, Washington's New Violent
Sexual PredatorCommitment System: An UnconstitutionalLaw & An Unwise Policy
Choice, 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 105, 138-141 (1990). A brief filed in the
Washington Supreme Court on behalf of the ACLU argues that "the constitutionally
acceptable way to deal with sex offender recidivists is to use... recidivist sentencing
statutes which permit extended incarceration including lifetime imprisonment for
repeat offenders .. " Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union of
Washington at 20, In re Young (Wash. filed Sept. 26, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter
ACLU Brief]. Another commentator argues that the State may use psychiatric
testimony of long-term dangerousness to enhance the criminal punishment of firsttime offenders and recidivists alike. Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness From Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 248
(1991). "This enhancement will tend to keep dangerous criminals in confinement for
longer periods." Id. at 248. At the same time, Gleb criticizes the SVP statute as "illconceived" on the ground that there are no "reliable means of identifying sex crime
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Such recommendations actually cut the heart out of the
preventive detention argument. Longer terms, especially
habitual offender life terms, are also a form of preventive
detention. A much longer prison term is obviously not based
on the third or fourth offense itself, but on the low-visibility
prediction that a third or fourth offender will continue to
offend. This raises the question whether preventive detention
is acceptable when it results from the processes of the criminal
law, but not when it is the result of a civil commitment process
perceived as less protective of offenders' rights. This may be
the case even though the consequence of criminal punishment
for each offender, regardless of the exercise of those rights,
would in many cases be more draconian.
In any event, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the problem of the criminal/civil dichotomy and has asserted its
approval of preventive detention under appropriate circumstances. 2 9 As mentioned above, one reason for the critics' characterization of the SVP statute as impermissible preventive
detention is that it is perceived as providing additional punishment in civil disguise but with procedures that are substantially less rigorous than those in the criminal justice system.
This position seems reflective of a long-standing view, stemming from the position taken by the U.S. Supreme Court in
the 1967 case of In re Gault,3 ° that a "civil" designation need
not be taken at face value if that term conceals actual punishment. The Court in Gault characterized the juvenile justice
system, labelled "civil," as really criminal in nature because
the state actually intended to punish juvenile offenders. In
that case, the Court required certain criminal-type trial protections instead of the lax civil procedures that had previously
been typical of juvenile cases.3 '
By 1985, the Supreme Court's views on the civil-criminal
dichotomy had changed. In Allen v. Illinois,2 the Supreme
Court ruled that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act,
which provides for civil commitment, is civil and regulatory in
recidivists ...." Id. at 247. Why should preventive detention be encouraged in the
crininal justice system but condemned when it is implemented through civil
commitment? See also Lisa T. Greenlees, Note, Washington State's Sexually Violent
PredatorsAct: Model or Mistake?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107 (1991), which concludes
that the statute is a mistake.
29. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
30. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
31. Id.
32. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
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Justice Rehnquist said, "[T]he State
serves its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually
dangerous persons by committing them to an institution
expressly designed to provide psychiatric
care and
nature, not criminal.

treatment.

33

Furthermore, the Court has decided a number of shortterm preventive detention cases in recent years.' One of the
most significant of these is the 1987 case of United States v.
Salerno,3 5 which concerned the constitutionality of the Bail
Reform Act of 1984.' That act permits the denial of bail to
criminal defendants who pose a serious threat of future criminal activity if released on bail.37 "Fat Tony" Salerno challenged the denial of bail to him under that act.
In upholding the constitutional validity of a statute that
permits short-term preventive detention, the U.S. Supreme
Court established a clear demarcation between civil regulatory
confinement and criminal confinement. The Court characterized the pretrial detention of Salerno not as "impermissible
punishment" before trial, as Salerno had claimed, but as the
civil regulation of a dangerous person.' The Court demonstrated that such regulatory detention of defendants in criminal cases had ample precedent in constitutional law.
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged the importance of
the liberty interest involved, but pointed out that "the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty
interest. '39 He stated, "the individual's strong interest in liberty... may, in circumstances where the government's inter33. Id. at 373.
34. Earlier cases are Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1970) and Schall v. Martin, 467
U.S. 253 (1984). These and other preventive detention cases are analyzed in Edward F.
Richards, The Jursprudenceof Prevention: The Right of Societal Sef-Defense Against
Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989) and in Albert W.
Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-Balancing
Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510 (1986).
35. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
36. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
37. More specifically, bail can be denied when the case involves the following:
(1) a crime of violence, (2) a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death, (3) a
major drug offense, or (4) a felony committed by a person previously convicted of two
of the crimes listed. The statute also authorizes detention without bond where a case
involves a "serious risk that [the defendant] will flee" or that he will "obstruct ...
justice, or threaten, injure, or intimidate a prospective witness or juror." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(f)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
38. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987).
39. See id. at 748.
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est is sufficiently weighty, be subordinated to the greater needs
of society.

' 40

Although the preventive detention in Salerno

was short-term, Justice Rehnquist cited as supporting the
Court's holding several cases approving the long-term unlimited confinement of "mentally unstable" and dangerous persons within the civil commitment structure, including
dangerous crininal defendants who were mentally ill and
incompetent to stand trial.4 '
Justice Rehnquist cited two leading cases, Addington v.
Texas 42 and Jackson v. Indiana4 3 as illustrations of the Court's
earlier approval of the involuntary and indeterminate confinement of these two classes of dangerous, mentally disordered
persons. He might also have cited, but did not, the case of
Jones v. United States," which approved the indeterminate
preventive detention of dangerous and mentally disordered
insanity acquittees.
These three types of commitment are long-established
illustrations of constitutionally approved preventive detention
that are based, as is the SVP statute, on the model of mental
disorder plus dangerousness. All are potentially indeterminate
in nature.
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court has again
addressed the issue of preventive detention of dangerous per4 5 The question before the Court
sons in Foucha v. Louisiana.
was the constitutionality of a Louisiana statute that permitted
the confinement of an insanity acquittee in a mental institution
on the sole ground that he was dangerous, without requiring
that he be mentally ill. In Foucha, the Court set limits to such
a confinement, holding that the Louisiana statute violated substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection of the laws.
It should be emphasized at the outset that the holding in
the Foucha case does not, on its own terms, apply to the Washington SVP statute because the Foucha decision concerned a
statute that did not require a finding of mental illness or
pathology, whereas the Washington statute does. Thus, the
Foucha statute and the Washington statute are fundamentally
40. 1& at 750-51.
41. Id. at 748-49.

42.
43.
44.
45.

441
406
463
112

U.S. 418 (1979).
U.S. 715 (1972).
U.S. 354 (1983).
S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
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different. The only conceivable basis on which the Court
might apply Foucha to the SVP statute would be if it found
that the mental pathology requirement in the Washington statute was a sham. Such a finding would be entirely inappropriate, however, as the discussion in Section IV of this Article
demonstrates. Furthermore, as indicated in Foucha, the Court
would almost certainly accept a state's own definition of
mental illness if that definition was within reasonable bounds.
In Foucha, the Court accepted Louisiana's definition of
antisocial personality disorder as nonmental illness, although
that disorder is included in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
DSM-III-R.46 The Court was not interested in defining mental
disorder and deferred to the state's reasonable definition.
Thus, Washington's inclusion in the SVP statute of antisocial
personality disorder as one form of mental pathology would
almost surely be accepted by the Court. To act otherwise
would be to reject previous Supreme Court decisions, as the
discussion in Section IV indicates.
Nevertheless, the Foucha case warrants at least a brief discussion here because other aspects of the case may bear on the
SVP statute and on the issue of preventive detention generally.
A more comprehensive discussion of the Foucha case is provided in Professor James Ellis's Article in this Symposium."
Foucha, who committed two serious crimes, had been
acquitted by reason of insanity at a bench trial. Under the prevailing Louisiana statute, he was automatically committed to a
state psychiatric hospital. After approximately three and a
half years, a review panel of three doctors recommended that
Foucha be conditionally discharged on the ground that he was
no longer mentally ill, if he had ever been. Three doctors
stated in a report that Foucha had not displayed any evidence
of mental illness or disease since admission. 48 A courtappointed doctor testified that Foucha had "probably suffered
from a drug induced psychosis"4 9 at the time of the crime, but
had recovered from that temporary condition and was now in
46. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASs'N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS, DSM-III-R 342-46 (3d ed. rev. 1987) [hereinafter DSM-III-R].
47. James W. Ellis, Limits on the State's Power to Confine "Dangerous"Persons:
Constitutional Implications of Foucha v. Louisiana, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 635
(1992).
48. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1782.
49. Id.
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"good shape," showing no signs of psychosis or neurosis. But,
said the doctor, Foucha did suffer from antisocial personality
disorder, a condition that "does not constitute a mental illness
and is not subject to medical treatment."'
On the question of
dangerousness, a psychiatrist testified that he would not "feel
comfortable in certifying that [Foucha] would not be a danger
to himself or to other people" because he had been involved in
altercations with other patients at the hospital. 5 Given this
evidence, the district court found Foucha to be dangerous to
himself or others and on that ground alone ordered him to be
recommited. The district court's decision was upheld by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, 2 over three dissents, then appealed
to the U.S. Supreme Court, which reversed.
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion, finding the statute
unconstitutional, was written by Justice White. It was joined
by a concurring opinion written by Justice O'Connor, who supported the result, but not the reasoning. The plurality opinion
found a denial of substantive due process, procedural due process, and equal protection of the laws. There were four dissenting votes. Two dissenting opinions were written by Justice
Kennedy and Thomas. Altogether, there were four written
opinions, each stressing different facets of the case.
Justice White, in effect, perceived the confinement of
Foucha in a mental hospital as a civil commitment. Based on
previous Supreme Court decisions, he interpreted that commitment as requiring for constitutional purposes a finding of
mental illness as well as dangerousness in cases where dangerousness is a ground for commitment. Nor did Justice White
find the holding of Jones v. United States,5 3 which concerned
the confinement of an insanity acquittee, inconsistent with the
civil commitment cases.
Inasmuch as the State of Louisiana had, understandably,
relied heavily on the Salerno-' case to support their statute,
Justice White devoted an important part of his opinion to the
implications of that case on Foucha's.
Justice White pointed out that the Court had, indeed, "in
certain narrow circumstances" permitted the "limited confine50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id. at 1782-83.
Id. at 1783.
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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ment" of dangerous persons, without more.5 5 But, he said, the
statute approved in Salerno carefully limited such detention to
cases involving the most serious of crimes, such as crimes of
violence and certain repeat offenders, and was "narrowly
focused" on a ' problem where government interests were
"overwhelming." Further, highly protective procedures were
involved, which he contended were not present in Foucha.
Finally, he argued, the Salerno statute strictly limited the
duration of confinement, in contrast to the Foucha statute
which, at least hypothetically, permitted lifetime confinement.
What is of particular interest is how Justice White's dicta
posed the implications of the State's argument in Foucha. Said
Justice White,
[T]he State asserts that Foucha may be held indefinitely
because he once committed a criminal act and now has an
antisocial personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a disorder for which there is no effective treatment.
This rationale would permit the State to hold indefinitely
any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill who could be
shown to have a personality disorder that may lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any convicted criminal, even though he has completed his prison term. It would
also be only a step away from substituting confinements for
dangerousness for our present system which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from permissible confinements for
mental illness, incarcerates only those who are proved
57
beyond reasonable doubt to have violated a criminal law.
These remarks are dicta that are not likely to be accepted by
Justice O'Connor, the swing voter in this case.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion also stressed the
distinction between the narrowly tailored Bail Reform Act
upheld in Salerno and the much broader mandate of Louisiana's statute. She limited the future impact of Foucha, however, by stressing that its ruling was addressed only to the
Louisiana statute and that the Court's ruling did not necessarily apply to "more narrowly drawn laws" 58 in which the nature
and duration of confinement of sane but dangerous insanity
acquittees were justified by pressing public safety concerns.
Justice O'Connor went so far as to state her view that the
55.
56.
57.
58.

Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1786.
Id.
Id. at 1787.
Id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

1992]

Constitutionalityof Committing

725

Court's holding did not prohibit Louisiana from confining sane
but dangerous insanity acquittees if it retailored its statute.
Although Justice O'Connor did not set forth clear-cut guidelines for a constitutionally acceptable statute, she did stress
that, at minimum, a sane but dangerous insanity acquittee
should not be confined for a period of time in excess of the
maximum prison term for the crime committed where there is
a conviction. 59 A provision setting a cap on confinement of a
currently "sane" insanity acquittee would not be inconsistent
with the ruling of Jones v. United States,' which held that
such a cap is not constitutionally required where the insanity
acquittee is mentally ill and dangerous. Justice O'Connor also
suggested that a more narrowly designed statute should distinguish between insanity acquittees who had committed violent
and serious crimes from those who had committed nonviolent
or relatively minor crimes, in cases where such crimes were
the "only" evidence of dangerousness. Finally, she argued that
"sane" insanity acquittees, if confined, should not be held as
mental patients, absent some medical justification, inasmuch as
the purpose of such a psychiatric confinement would not be
present, the acquittee not being mentally ill and not in need of
psychiatric treatment.6 '
Inasmuch as Justice O'Connor cast a "swing vote" in
Foucha that won a majority for the decision, her narrow view
of the ruling in that case is crucial. It should not be too difficult for any state to revise a questionable statute so as to meet
Justice O'Connor's objections. There is little question but that
Justice O'Connor would join the four dissenters to form a new
majority in a case dealing with a statute such as Washington's
SVP statute, where mental illness is a requirement and where
the statute is, in fact, very narrowly drawn to apply to exceedingly dangerous offenders, where the government's interests
are compelling.
Thus, the import of Salerno remains vital for the Washington statute. What remains at issue is an interpretation of the
limitations imposed upon Salerno. Justice White's views are to
a significant extent at odds with those of Justice O'Connor. He
has stressed the "strictly limited" duration of pretrial detention. Justice O'Connor, however, would presumably accept a
59. Id. at 1790 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
60. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
61. Foucha, 112 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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lengthy confinement if it is not in excess of a maximum penalty for the crime or crimes committed. In Foucha's case this
could be as long as thirty-two years.
In sum, the Foucha case, along with the other cases discussed above, seems to demonstrate that if the Young and Cunningham cases come before the Supreme Court, a majority of
the justices will uphold the constitutionality of the SVP statute
as a proper exercise of the State's regulatory powers.
Nevertheless, the moral issue remains. Is it morally
acceptable to preventively detain extremely violent sex offenders on the basis of a prediction of future dangerousness, the
validity of which has been vigorously challenged? This question, which underscores the notion that it is not preventive
detention per se that is objectionable, but only unfair preventive detention, is further discussed in Sections VI and VII,
which analyze predictions of dangerousness. But, before we
come to that culminating issue, we will discuss the issues of
mental condition and efficacy of treatment.
IV.

THE MENTAL PATHOLOGY COMPONENT

As indicated in Foucha,2 it has been broadly accepted for
many years that the civil commitment of a dangerous person to
a mental institution requires a finding of mental disorder or
pathology as well as dangerousness. The drafters of the Sexually Violent Predator statute anticipated the thrust of the
Foucha decision. The SVP statute was enacted on the understanding that, along with the dangerousness of the offender,
some form of mental pathology should justify the commitment.
Accordingly, the statute provides that, for purposes of commitment, the offender must suffer from either a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder" that causes the likelihood
of future predatory acts of sexual violence. 3 The disorder may
not merely co-exist with the sexual behavior, but must be
responsible for it.
One criticism of the mental pathology components of the
SVP statute is that sex offender civil commitment statutes in
general, and this one in particular, are based on the faulty
assumption that all sex offenders are mentally disordered,
whereas in fact most of them are not and that their deviant
behavior does not "in and of itself" constitute a mental disor62. Id. at 1780.
63. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91).
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der.' It is argued, moreover, that to make "broad generalizations as to a causal relationship between sexual offenses in
general and any particular condition" is inappropriate.6 5 But
these critics agree that some sex offenders do suffer from some
form of "recognized mental disorder."'
There is universal agreement that many sex offenders are
not mentally disordered. But such a view does not detract
from the equally valid proposition that a certain number of
violent sex offenders do, in fact, suffer from some form of
mental pathology. Some may be psychotic, although the SVP
statute does not emphasize such a group that could invoke an
insanity defense. If the SVP statute is directed only at offenders who suffer from some form of pathology and identifies
them in an acceptable way, it is not subject to the sweeping
objection that "not all" violent sex offenders are "sick."
Another criticism is that the term "mental abnormality,"
as used to identify disordered offenders, is "hopelessly vague"
and cannot be applied accurately or uniformly. How valid are
these criticisms? Let us consider, first, the term "personality
disorder."
A.

Personality Disorder

The particular personality disorder most likely to be
applied in the case of a violent sexual predator is Antisocial
Personality Disorder. 67 Offenders diagnosed in this manner
are familiarly referred to as psychopaths or sociopaths. This
mental condition seems to be the less controversial of the two
in the statute, apparently because it is listed in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, DSM-III-R. According to the Washington
State Psychiatric Association, the term is not objectionable
because it has a "clinically recognized meaning. '6 8 Ironically,
although the Association accepts this diagnostic label as "clinically recognized," it is, in fact, somewhat controversial. The
labels "psychopath" and "sexual psychopath" have been frequently denounced as meaningless.6 9
64.
(Wash.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Amicus Curiae Brief of Washington State Psychiatric Ass'n at 3, In re Young
filed Sept. 20, 1991) (No. 57837-1) [hereinafter WSPA Brief].
Id at 4.
1L at 3.
See DSM-III-R, supra note 46, at 342-46.
WSPA Brief, supra note 64, at 8.
For example, psychiatrist Seymour Halleck has stated: "Even within
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Moreover, psychiatrists disagree widely about whether
personality disorder is a "mental disease" or "mental illness."
In fact, in the Foucha case, the majority of the Supreme Court
based its holding on the assumption that Foucha was no longer
mentally ill, although he was diagnosed as having a personality
disorder.7 0 The Supreme Court's ruling seems to have
accepted this view because the hospital doctors held it. It
seems to be a reasonably safe assumption that if mental health
professionals view antisocial personality disorder as a form of
mental disorder, as the DSM-III-R does, the Supreme Court
would accept that position as a fulfillment of the mental disorder requirement for involuntary civil commitment.
The term "sexual psychopath" has been a common one for
many years and many sex offender statutes are called "sex
psychopath laws." Indeed, despite the ruling in the Foucha
case, it would be difficult to attack as unconstitutional the use
in sex offender legislation of the term "personality disorder,"
under which subsumes the more specific diagnosis of antisocial
personality disorder, in light of the 1940 U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Minnesota ex. rel Pearson v. Probate Ct.." In Pearson, the Court ruled that a Minnesota statute did not violate
due process by providing for the indeterminate commitment of
sex offenders with a "psychopathic personality." The Minnesota Supreme Court had defined "psychopathic personality" as
describing persons "who, by an habitual course of misconduct
in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to
control their sexual impulses and who, as a result, are likely to
attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the
objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire. '"72
Washington's definition of a sexual psychopath is awkward. Its definition, taken from another statute, is as follows:
"[A]ny person who is affected in a form of psychoneurosis or in
a form of psychopathic personality, which form predisposes
such person to the commission of sexual offenses in a degree
psychiatry there is widespread disagreement as to whether psychopathy is a form of
mental illness, a form of evil or a form of fiction." SEYMOUR L. HALLECK, M.D.,
PSYCHIATRY AND THE DILEMMAS OF CRIME 99 (1967). The Group for the Advancement
of Psychiatry has stated that the term "sexual psychopath" is not a psychiatric
diagnosis and has no precise clinical meaning. GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRY AND SEX PSYCHOPATH LEGISLATION:

THE 30'S TO THE 80's

840 (1977).
70. See generally Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
71. 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (upholding sexual psychopath classification as valid).
72. Id. at 273.
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constituting him a menace to the health or safety of others."73
"Psychopathic personality" means the "existence in any person
of such hereditary, congenital or acquired condition affecting
the emotional or volitional rather than the intellectual field or
manifested by anomalies of such character as to render satisfactory social adjustment of such person difficult or
impossible." 4
An objection to the use of the term "sexual psychopath" as
a general characterization of sex offenders selected for civil
commitment is that many offenders are not psychopaths and
do not have a "personality disorder," but suffer from some
other mental condition such as sexual sadism, pedophilia, or
other paraphilia.7 5 Moreover, the DSM-III-R, in its list of the
characteristic behaviors of persons with antisocial personality
disorder, does not single out sexual offenses as particularly
indicative of that disorder. The DSM-III-R diagnosis does refer
to a "pattern of irresponsible and antisocial behavior," including a failure "to conform to social norms with respect to lawful
behavior, as indicated by repeatedly performing antisocial acts
that are grounds for arrest (whether arrested or not) ....""
Moreover, in its list of behaviors prior to the age of fifteen,
three of which tend to indicate antisocial personality disorder,
the act of having "forced someone into sexual activity with him
or her" is one criterion.7 7
Despite the DSM-III-R's lack of more specific examples,
deviant sexual behaviors are generally considered to be indicators of antisocial personality disorder if coupled with lack of
empathy for the victim, lack of remorse for the act, and belief
that the criminal behavior is justified.7
B

Mental Abnormality

"Mental abnormality" is defined in the SVP statute as a
"congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to the commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree constituting such
73. WAsH. REV. CODE § 71.06.010 (1989).

74. Idl
75. For an early criticism of the term "sexual psychopath," see Frederick J.
Hacker & Marcel Frym, The Sexual PsychopathAct in Practice: A CriticalDiscussion,
43 CAL. L. REV. 766, 770 (1955).
76. See DSM-III-R, supra note 46, at 345.
77. Id at 344.
78. Id. at 346.
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person a menace to the health and safety of others."7 9
The Washington State Psychiatric Association argues that
the term "mental abnormality" is "hopelessly vague," and "has
no clinically significant meaning" as applied to sex offenders8 0
The Association further argues that because the term mental
abnormality "is not employed as a diagnostic or explanatory
concept in authoritative texts such as the DSM-III-R," and
"has no recognized diagnostic use, there is no way to assure
with a reasonable medical certainty that it will be applied accurately and uniformly in cases arising under the Statute."'"
This argument indirectly suggests that other psychiatric terms
commonly used in criminal and civil law are applied uniformly
and accurately, which is hardly the case. Whenever psychiatric
nomenclature is involved in the law, there is invariably great
latitude in interpretation and application. For that reason, the
question is not whether the term is a common psychiatric
term, but whether the term would be applied fairly.
The "mental abnormality" language is not intended to be a
psychiatric term. The fact that it is not listed as such in the
DSM-III-R is irrelevant. It is a legal term, intended to convey a
form of pathology that leads to violent sexual offenses.
In using the term, the legislature seems to have been well
aware that a significant number of sex offenders suffer from
some form of mental condition, or pathology, that impairs volitional controls and causes them to behave in the compulsive,
repetitive, irrational, and self-destructive ways that are typical
of mental disorders.
Dr. Gene Abel of Emory University Medical School, a psychiatric leader in the field of sexual pathology, has commented
on sex offenders who commit deviant sex acts; he has pointed
out that "their compulsive, repetitive, driven behavior, which
at times has no rational, logical reward, appears to fit the criteria of an emotional or psychological illness." 2
These mental conditions and behaviors have not as yet
been adequately dealt with by the psychiatric profession, either
in the diagnosis and treatment of sex offenders or in the DSM79. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(2) (Supp. 1990-91).

80. See WSPA Brief, supra note 64, at 7.
81. Id.
82. Gene G. Abel & Joanne L. Rouleau, Male Sex Offenders, in HANDBOOK OF
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT OF ADULTS 271 (Michael E. Thase et al. eds., 1990).
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III-R, which contains all of the acceptable mental disorders
agreed upon by official psychiatry.
The DSM-III-R does contain a category for paraphilias,
which are characterized by "arousal in response to sexual
objects or situations that are not part of normative arousalactivity patterns.... ."" The diagnostic category of paraphilia
includes pedophilia, sexual sadism, masochism, voyeurism, and
an assortment of miscellaneous disorders such as necrophilia,
but not rape. Pedophilia is described in DSM-III-R as involving
recurrent and intense sexual urges and sexually arousing fantasies concerning prepubescent children thirteen years of age
or younger.8 4 The sexual behavior may consist of acts that
involve no actual physical contact with the child such as
undressing, exposing oneself, or masturbating in the presence
of the child. Or the acts may be potentially even more traumatic to the child, involving fondling, fellatio, cunnilingus, or
penetration of the child's vagina, anus, or mouth, using varying
degrees of force."5 The pedophilic behavior may be coupled
with another paraphilia, sexual sadism, which involves acts in
which the psychological or physical suffering of the victim is
sexually exciting. 8 The mutilation by Earl Shriner of his
seven-year-old victim is an illustration of pedophilia coupled
with sexual sadism.
Although rape per se is not included in the DSM-III-R's list
of sexual disorders, to the extent that sexual sadism is
included, that disorder can include rapes and other sexual
assaults as manifestations of sexual sadism. In such cases, "the
suffering inflicted on the victim is far in excess of that necessary to gain compliance, and the visible pain of the victim is
sexually arousing."8 7
But why is uncontrollable pathological rape not included
as such in the DSM-III-R? Dr. Abel has suggested at least two
reasons. First, he says, psychiatry has had "limited contact
with the more aggressive sex offenders, and as a consequence,
less information has been available regarding sexual aggressiveness as compared to the less aggressive paraphiliacs."'
Second, the leaders of the psychiatric profession seem to
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

DSM-III-R, supra note 46, at 279.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 284-87.
Id. at 287.
Id.
Gene G. Abel & Joanne L. Rouleau, The Nature and Extent of Sexual Assault,
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be unwilling to accept sexual misbehaviors such as rape as a
diagnosis for fear that such a diagnosis could be used to establish a psychiatric excuse for escaping punishment.
In fact, the task force on paraphilias convened to revise
the DSM-III actually concluded that the weight of scientific
evidence supported the inclusion of rape as a paraphilia that
they called "paraphilic coercive disorder," a category intended
only for individuals with intense, repetitive urges of six
months duration to commit rape, who had either acted on
these urges or were disturbed by their presence. But the recommendation was disapproved by the Board of Directors of the
American Psychiatric Association. 9 Inasmuch as the DSM
refers to "disorders," the failure to include paraphilic rape in
the DSM-III-R as a "disorder" may be the reason the drafters
of the SVP statute used the term "mental abnormality" instead
of disorder.
According to Dr. Abel, the behavior of certain rapists fits
logically within the general rationale of paraphilia because rapists report having recurrent, repetitive, and compulsive urges
and fantasies to commit rape. Says Dr. Abel, "These offenders
attempt to control their urges, but the urges eventually
become so strong that they act upon them, commit rapes, and
then feel guilty afterwards with a temporary reduction of
Such a cycle is
urges, only to have the cycle repeat again."'
similar to the clinical picture presented by other recognized
paraphilias.
Of course, not all rapists fit the paraphiliac rationale.
Many rapists are "mentally normal" in the sense that their
rapes do not stem from pathology. To be identified as coming
within the term "mentally abnormal," a rapist selected for civil
commitment should have a recurrent, compulsive urge and a
pathological need to repetitively carry out psychologically
driven rape.
In sum, the Washington legislature, in providing for the
mental disability element required for a constitutionally valid
civil commitment, has used two terms that should cover the
range of pathologies affecting violent sex offenders.
in

HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT:

ISSUES AND TREATMENT

OF THE OFFENDER 18

(William L. Marshall et al. eds., 1990).
89. Gene G. Abel, Paraphilias,in V COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY

1069, 1079-80 (Harold I. Kaplain et al. eds., 1989).
90. See Abel & Rouleau, supra note 88, at 18.
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In using the term "personality disorder," the legislature
has wisely repudiated the antiquated term "sexual psychopath"
with its false connotation that all or most sex offenders are
psychopaths. In using the broader term, which includes antisocial personality disorder, the legislature has identified those
sex offenders whose behavior fits the DSM-III-R's stated diagnosis of personality disorder. Some mentally disordered sex
offenders will come within that diagnosis; many will not.
In using the concept of "mental abnormality" the legislature has invoked a more generalized terminology that can
cover a much larger variety of disorders. Some, such as the
paraphilias, are covered in the DSM-III-R; others are not. The
fact that pathologically driven rape, for example, is not yet
listed in the DSM-III-R does not invalidate such a diagnosis.
The DSM is, after all, an evolving and imperfect document.
Nor is it sacrosanct. Furthermore, it is in some areas a political document whose diagnoses are based, in some cases, on
what American Psychiatric Association ("APA") leaders consider to be practical realities. What is critical for our purposes
is that psychiatric and psychological clinicians who testify in
good faith as to mental abnormality are able to identify sexual
pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other pathologies already listed in the DSM.
V.

THE EFFICACY OF TREATMENT

The SVP statute provides for the care and treatment of a
civilly committed violent sex offender,9" although the legislature has acknowledged that "the prognosis for curing sexually
violent offenders is poor" and that the "treatment needs of this
92
population are very long-term.
The Washington State Psychiatric Association, in attacking
the legislation, asserts: "There is no scientifically reliable and
persuasive data showing that violent sex offenders can be successfully treated."9 3 Some studies show that the recidivism
rate for treated offenders appears to be the same as that for
untreated offenders, indicating lack of successful treatment.9 4
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (Supp. 1990-91).
92. Id. § 71.09.010.
93. See WSPA Brief, supra note 64, at 10.
94. Vikki H. Sturgeon & John Taylor, Report of a Five-Year Follow-up Study of
Mentally DisorderedSex Offenders Released from Atascadero State Hospital in 1973, 4

CRIM. JusT. J. 31 (1980).
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Inasmuch as various treatment modalities for sex offenders are discussed elsewhere in this Symposium,

95

there is no

need to examine the efficacy of those treatment modalities
here. But even if there is agreement that the state of the art
shows treatment ineffectiveness, is that dispositive of the
issue? What is relevant here are two questions: first, whether
the treatment provision of the statute meets constitutional
requirements, and, second, whether the asserted lack of effectiveness of treatment undercuts the morality of the statute.
The Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on the
issue of the constitutional right to treatment of mentally disordered persons. It avoided the issue in the case of O'Connor v.
Donaldson,' where the right to treatment issue was presented.
However, the Court decided that case on an entirely different
basis. In Youngberg v. Romeo,' however, the Court did confront the issue of the constitutional right to care and treatment
for retarded persons. Romeo had claimed a constitutional right
to safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily
restraints, and a right to "minimally adequate habilitation" or
training.

98

The Court ruled in Romeo that institutionalized mentally
retarded residents enjoy "constitutionally protected interests
in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be
required by these interests."" The Court further stated that
retarded persons are constitutionally entitled to "minimally
adequate training";'0° the Court said that in this case, the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution "is such
training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty
interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable
restraints."'O' The Court further stated that "reasonableness"
and "minimal adequacy" should be defined by qualified profes03
sionals, 0 2 whose judgments are presumptively correct.
95. See Jeffrey Klotz et al., Cognitive RestructuringThrough Law: A Therapeutic
JurisprudenceApproach to Sex Offenders and the PleaProcess, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 579 (1992).
96. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
97. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
98. Id. at 316-17.

99. Id. at 324.
100. Id. at 322.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 322-23.
103. Id. at 324.
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Finally, the Court said that the state "has considerable discretion in determining the nature and scope of its responsibilities."10 4 The issue of efficaciousness did not arise.
In Allen v. Illinois, 0 5 the Supreme Court suggested that
the treatment objective of the state might be an important factor in determining whether a civil commitment under the state
is regulatory or criminal. But, again, the Court did not consider the question of whether the treatment would have to be
efficacious, nor was that issue presented.10°
Washington's statute provides that "the involuntary detention or commitment of persons under this chapter shall conform to constitutional requirements for care and treatment."'0 7
These requirements do not appear to demand efficacy, and it is
unlikely that the Court will rule otherwise.
Assuming that a constitutional challenge to a lack of efficacy will not prevail, does a question of fairness or morality
remain? If the SVP statute is perceived as primarily a "treatment program," and if treatment is not likely to work, there
appears to be a massive hypocrisy if violent sexual offenders
are confined, ostensibly to treat them, when the likelihood of
success is remote. This alleged hypocrisy troubles many critics
of the statute.
But it must be recognized that the goal of the SVP statute
is not primarily treatment. 0 8 The statute is designed to confine an extremely limited number of dangerous and mentally
abnormal persons because they are too dangerous to be at
large, where the criminal justice system has failed in its duty
to protect society. It is not necessary that treatment be efficacious. Whether it is fair or moral to confine offenders in the
absence of efficacious treatment is discussed in the conclusion
of this Article.
VI.

PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE VIOLENT BEHAVIOR

An essential feature of the Sexually Violent Predator statute is its requirement that a prediction be made that the
offender selected for civil commitment be "likely to engage in
104. Id

at 317.

105. 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
106. Id.
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.080 (Supp. 1990-91).

108. This position is also asserted in the ACLU brief filed in the Superior Court.
According to the brief, "[T]he primary purpose of the law is not treatment, but
preventive detention." ACLU Brief, supra note 28, at 12.
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Can such a prediction be made by a mental health professional and accepted by judge or jury with a reasonable degree
of confidence? Some critics of the act insist that it cannot and
that it is next to impossible to do so." ° This Article asserts
that such predictions can be made with acceptable accuracy,
not only in a number of contexts, but particularly with respect
to violent sexual offenders.
The extent to which psychiatrists, psychologists, and other
mental health professionals can make accurate long-term predictions of future dangerous behavior of mentally disordered
persons has been under attack for at least twenty years. The
perceived wisdom until recently can be succinctly illustrated
by the frequently expressed proposition that when these professionals make such predictions, they are likely to be wrong at
least two times out of three. 1"
This conclusion is based on empirical research done over
the years by a number of social scientists, but most particularly
by Henry Steadman and his colleagues, whose original
research dealt with the subsequent violent behavior of a cohort
of 967 patients who had been transferred from prison to security mental hospitals. These patients were discharged following
the Baxstrom v. Herold decision by the U.S. Supreme Court,
which declared their continued involuntary hospitalization following termination of their prison sentences to be unconstitutional because of procedural defects." 2
Steadman's findings, following up on earlier studies, have
become highly influential and have been adopted, in effect, by
the American Psychiatric Association" 3 and cited in a variety
of settings, including an important dissenting opinion in the
case of Barefoot v. Estelle,1 4 decided in 1983 by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Barefoot case was preceded by the U.S. Supreme
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.020(1) (Supp. 1990-91). There is no requirement
that the acts be imminent.
110. The ACLU brief before the Washington Supreme Court states that accurately
predicting dangerousness is "virtually impossible." ACLU Brief, supra note 28, at 32.
111. JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47-49
(1981).
112. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
113. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the American Psychiatric Association,

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
114. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
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Court's decision in Jurek v. Texas," 5 where the question of the
validity of predictions of dangerousness was raised for the first
time in a death penalty case. The Court rejected the argument
that "it is impossible to predict future behavior and that the
question is so vague as to be meaningless."" 6 The Court
acknowledged that to predict future dangerous behavior was
"not easy,""' 7 but Justice Stevens stated:
"[T]he fact that such a determination is difficult, however,
does not mean that it cannot be made. Indeed, prediction of
future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of
the decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system. The decision whether to admit a defendant to bail, for
instance, must often turn on a judge's prediction of the
defendant's future conduct. And any sentencing authority
must predict a convicted person's probable future conduct
when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose. For those sentenced to prison, these same
predictions must be made by parole authorities. The task
that a Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory
question in issue is thus basically no different from the task
performed countless times each day throughout the American system of criminal justice. What is essential is that the
jury have before it all possible relevant information about
the individual defendant whose fate it must determine."118
But Jurek dealt only with the admissibility of predictions, not
with the question of who should be permitted to do the
predicting.
Later, in Barefoot,"' also a death penalty case, the Court
went a step further and addressed the "who" question. The
Barefoot case tested the constitutional validity of the use of
psychiatric testimony concerning the future dangerousness of a
convicted murderer who could be executed if the jury found
that he would be dangerous in the future. The majority of the
Court ruled that such testimony was acceptable. A dissent by
Justice Blackmun, relying heavily on the research of Steadman
and others, as recapitulated by Professor John Monahan,
argued that such testimony was inherently fallacious and that
it should not have been permitted on the question of the death
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

428 U.S. 262 (1976).
Id at 274.
Id.
Id. at 274-76.
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 880.
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penalty. 120 Professor Monahan had written that "the 'best'
clinical research currently in existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of
three predictions of violent behavior over a several-year period
among institutionalized populations that had both committed
violence in the past... and who were diagnosed as mentally
ill.' 121 Justice Blackmun also cited the APA amicus curiae
brief in Barefoot, which claimed that "[t]he unreliability of psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness is by
now an established fact within the profession. "122
The majority opinion in Barefoot, in rejecting the contention that such psychiatric testimony should be barred, did not
present an adequate analysis of the flawed empirical research
underlying the dissent's position. The Court simply asserted,
without further analysis, that "[w]e are not persuaded that
such testimony is almost entirely unreliable.' ' 23 Elsewhere in
the opinion the Court said, "Neither petitioner nor the [American Psychiatric] Association suggests that psychiatrists are
always wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most
25
of the time,"'' 24 a statement that has led to some ridicule.
Nowhere in the majority opinion upholding psychiatric predictions is there a challenge to the proposition that two out of
three predictions of dangerousness are wrong.
That a majority of the Supreme Court would validate the
use of psychiatric predictions of long-term dangerousness
where the consequence, if the prediction is accepted by the
jury, is death, clearly indicates commitment to the use of such
predictions. Moreover, the Court also upheld, in Jones v.
United States,126 the use of predictions of future violent behavior in cases involving persons involuntarily committed following an insanity acquittal, as well as in a variety of other
settings, including routine civil commitments.127 It therefore
seems highly unlikely that the Court would balk at the use of
such predictions under the SVP statute.
120. Id. at 907-39.
121. MONAHAN, supra note 111, at 47-49.
122. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 920.

123. Id. at 899.
124. Id. at 901.
125. See, e.g., Murray Levine, The Adversary Process and Social Science in the

Courts: Barefoot v. Estelle, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 147 (1984).
126. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
127. In Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984), the Court said that "there is
nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct."

1992)

Constitutionalityof Committing

But what about the moral issue? Even if the use of these
predictions is constitutionally acceptable, should we nevertheless have moral reservations about them if they are, as
claimed, highly inaccurate? If it were true that for every one
accurate prediction of future dangerousness two would be inaccurate, we would be confining two "false positives" for every
"true positive" 128 under the SVP statute. That is a price in
human liberty that many libertarians regard as too high to pay.
An examination of the moral issue requires an analysis of
prediction research that has not yet been made by the U.S.
Supreme Court or, indeed, by any other court. Justice Stevens'
opinion in Jurek ignored the empirical findings discussed
here."2 Stevens relied on the practical view that predictions of
dangerousness were, in fact, being made in numerous settings
in thousands of cases and that the practice should not be
disturbed.
In Barefoot, Justice White did not ignore the empirical
research that formed the basis of Justice Blackmun's dissent.
He actually went so far as to acknowledge its validity 3 0 but

concluded that the empirical findings should not influence the
court. He reasoned, first, as had Justice Stevens, that to ask
the Court to exclude psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness was "somewhat like asking us to disinvent the
wheel."''
Second, he argued that the adversarial system is
"competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of [the
testimony's] shortcomings.'

13 2

This Article challenges the previously unquestioned validity of the general proposition that only one out of three predictions of future dangerousness of mentally disordered persons is
accurate. Moreover, the Article will attempt to demonstrate
that the proposition is particularly inapplicable to predictions
of the future dangerousness of mentally abnormal violent sex33

ual offenders.1

128. A "false positive" is a prediction of future dangerous behavior that turns out
to be incorrect. A "true positive" is one that turns out to be correct. False and true
negatives apply to predictions of nondangerousness.

129. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
130. Justice Blackmun called attention to this in his dissent, saying, "The Court
does not dispute this proposition [that two out of three predictions of dangerousness
are wrong] and indeed it could not do so; the evidence is overwhelming." Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 920 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 896.
132. I& at 899.
133. Professor John Monahan, a leading theorist on dangerousness predictions
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First, this Article argues that much of the empirical
research leading to the "two-out-of-three" proposition, as it
applies generally to mentally disordered persons, is flawed. It
does not identify or address serious methodological deficiencies
that have resulted in skewed findings that exaggerate the proportion of false positives. Second, conclusions about predictive
inaccuracy that have been drawn from the research are not
applicable to the particular cohort of mentally abnormal violent sex offenders who are the subjects of the SVP statute.
Third, very little research has been done on the particular
cohort dealt with by this statute, although such modest
research as has been done seems to result in findings that are
substantially different from findings that have been presented
in briefs and numerous legal analyses in this area.
Because of these flaws and problems, and because most of
the previous research is inapplicable to the cohort of pathological sex offenders dealt with here, this Article will argue that
little is still known about the accuracy of dangerousness predictions about this specific group. What little we do know,
however, should give us greater confidence in the validity of
the predictions that are being made under the statute.
A.

Methodological Flaws'3 4

Most empirical studies of dangerousness predictions have
who has been largely responsible for disseminating the one-in-three formulation, now
seems to be reconsidering its validity. In an important 1988 article, Monahan presents
a comprehensive critique of earlier prediction studies and expresses second thoughts
about his earlier one-out-of-three position. He refers to research published within the
last eleven years whose results challenge that view as well as other conclusions about
dangerousness predictions. Much of the new research deals with civil patient cohorts.
In his article, Professor Monahan analyzes a number of methodological problems in
previous research and concludes that if predictor and criterion variables are enriched
and other methodological problems overcome, "it is possible that the next generation
of risk assessment studies will yield results quite different than those to which we
have become accustomed." John Monahan, Risk Assessment of Violence Among the
Mentally Disordered. Generating Useful Knowledge, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249,
255 (1988). Another important article, one of whose co-authors (Litwack) originally
supported the one-in-three approach, also deals with methodological problems and new
research. See Thomas R. Litwack et al., The Assessment of Dangerousness &
Predictionsof Violence, - PSYCHIATRIC Q. - (forthcoming 1992). See also Thomas R.
Litwack & Louis B. Schlesinger, Assessing and Predicting Violence: Research, Law,
and Applications, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY 205 (I. Weiner & A. Hess
eds., 1987).
134. The Author does not intend that this discussion of methodological flaws be
exhaustive. Only the most important ones are analyzed; additional flaws will not be
discussed at this time.
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methodological flaws, some minor, others major, as a result of
which their conclusions are questionable. But these flaws are
often not identified. Steadman and Cocozza, however, have
acknowledged significant flaws in their first and pioneering
study of the so-called Baxstrom cohort."3
Over a period of four years, Steadman and Cocozza studied
967 patients who, as a result of the Baxstrom 1'3 decision, had
been discharged from two maximum security mental hospitals,
either to civil hospitals or to the community. They concluded
that few patients in the Baxstrom cohort turned out to be dangerous and further asserted that their study demonstrated that
psychiatrists were unable to predict dangerousness accurately.
In his Barefoot dissent, Justice Blackmun cited four Steadman
studies to support his argument that "psychiatric predictions of
long-term future violence are wrong more often than they are
right" 137 and that psychiatrists have "no expertise in predicting
long-term future dangerousness."'

3

But Steadman and Cocozza have acknowledged three significant methodological limitations in their first studies. First,
their examination of psychiatric predictions was in fact not
based on explicit predictions of dangerousness by psychiatrists
but was conducted with the assumption that such predictions
had been made. No such predictions were ever found. How
many transfers were made for reasons other than a finding of
dangerousness-such as bureaucratic inertia and the like-we
will never know. Second, the members of the Baxstrom cohort
were, on average, forty-seven years old. Steadman and
Cocozza acknowledged that the low level of subsequent dangerous behavior of the Baxstrom cohort might well have
resulted from the advanced age of the cohort members. Had a
dangerousness prediction been made at the time of confinement, it might have been relatively accurate at that time. It
was not tested at the time, however. As Cocozza and
Steadman pointed out, crime is a young man's activity. 39
Finally, the mean length of continuous institutionalization for
members of the Baxstrom cohort was almost fifteen years,
135. Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric
Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV.

1084 (1976).
136. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
137. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 921 (1983).
138. Id. at 921-22.
139. See Cocozza & Steadman, supra note 135, at 1084.
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another significant factor leading to reduced subsequent violent behavior. These limitations severely undercut the validity
of the conclusions drawn.
The other major methodological flaws or deficiencies in a
variety of empirical studies of dangerousness predictions further considered here are: (1) the exclusion of and failure to
identify significant samples of persons who might be dangerous
and whose omission from studies has led to ambiguous conclusions; (2) the use of inadequate outcome criteria, such as
arrests or convictions, to determine the extent of subsequent
dangerous behavior; (3) the problem of undetected and undetectable dangerous behavior of sex offenders; (4) the application of predictions of average or typical dangerousness to each
cohort member regardless of significant individual characteristics of that offender that might yield different results; (5) the
application of findings about one cohort of persons, such as
schizophrenics, to members of other cohorts, such as psychopaths or paraphiliacs, who have substantially different characteristics and behaviors; and (6) variations in the definition of
dangerousness. 140 We shall examine each of these flaws in
turn.
1.

Excluding and Ignoring Significant Samples

A common method of evaluating the accuracy of predictions about dangerousness or nondangerousness is to study the
subsequent behavior of a patient discharged by a judge following both a recommendation based on a prediction of
nondangerousness or a recommendation based on a prediction
of dangerousness. This standard approach has one major limitation, often not recognized. It overlooks what might have
been the subsequent behavior of a person who is predicted to
be dangerous but whom the judge does not discharge. The subsequent behavior of that person in the community cannot be
studied.
One of the best known and most widely cited studies of
mental health professionals' predictions of future violence is
that of Kozol, Boucher, and Garofalo, who reported in 1972 on
a ten-year study of 592 male offenders, most of whom were vio140. A number of these methodological problems, though not all, are discussed in
Monahan, supra note 133.
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lent sex offenders.' 4 ' Each offender was examined by at least
two psychiatrists, two psychologists, and a social worker, and a
careful reconstruction of each offender's life history was
provided.
The team of Kozol and associates recommended the
release of 386 men as nondangerous. All 386 were released.
The team opposed the release of 106 men. Of that cohort, the
judges discharged 49 but retained 57. A total of 435 men were
discharged by the judges. Of the 386 men recommended as
nondangerous, only 8% later committed an act of violence
within the study period. Apparently 92% did not. Thus, the
were overwhelmingly
predictions of nondangerousness
accurate.

1 42

Of the 106 men predicted to be potentially violent, however, only 49 were discharged. Of the latter group of 49, 34.7%
later committed an act of violence, a false positive rate of over
65%, which supported the one-in-three proposition. 143 But
what of the 57 men who were not discharged by the judge? We
can only speculate as to how those men would have behaved if
discharged. If a substantial proportion of those 57, about whom
the professionals and judge agreed as to potential dangerousness, had been discharged and later committed violent acts, the
proportion of false positives would surely have been much
lower.
It seems reasonable to infer that the men judicially discharged despite a prediction of dangerousness were marginal
cases about whom disagreement between the judge and the
team as to dangerousness seemed reasonable. But the men in
the nonmarginal and more obvious cases of dangerousness
about whom the judge and team were in agreement as to dangerousness would almost surely have committed a much higher
level of violent acts if released. If only 37 of the 57 more
clearly dangerous men had been released and had committed a
violent act, the proportion of accurate predictions would have
been more like 50%. Of course, we will never know. But,
under the circumstances, it does seem unrealistic to cite the
Kozol study unqualifiedly for the proposition that psychiatrists
are "wrong in two out of every three predictions of discovered
141. Harry L. Kozol et al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18
CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1972).

142. Id.
143. Id.
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'
violence."'"
To the extent that judges accepted the dangerousness predictions of the team, they actually prevented a more
valid and realistic evaluation of predictive accuracy. What is
perhaps of some concern is that the sample deficiency discussed here was not identified in evaluations of this study,
leading to an erroneous perception of the validity of this
important and frequently cited study.

2.

Inadequate Outcome Criteria

Many prediction studies use subsequent arrests or convictions as outcome criteria for determining whether subsequent
dangerous behavior has occurred. But it is obvious that much
violent behavior, even when detected, is responded to in a variety of ways other than arrests. Typical responses are hospitalization, police adjustment, family adjustment, and the like. It
has been reported, for example, that fifty percent of schizophrenic patients studied who committed acts of violence in the
community were not arrested but sent to a hospital. 4 5 Moreover, arrests in other states are seldom recorded. Studies that
rely exclusively on in-state arrests and convictions tend to
underestimate the extent of subsequent dangerous behavior
and skew conclusions about false positives.
The same is true for studies that use violence in the hospital as an outcome measure. Many patients who are predicted
to be dangerous and who are subsequently hospitalized for that
reason are heavily medicated and closely supervised to curtail
their violent behavior." The prediction that they are dangerous, which may be highly accurate, becomes the very mechanism for preventing that dangerousness and for appearing to
contradict the validity of the prediction. 4 7
3.

Undetected Behavior

An egregious weakness of much empirical research on the
144. MONAHAN, supra note 111, at 44.

145. Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, Crime, Inpatient Admissions, and
Violence Among Male Mental Patients, 11 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 305 (1988).
146. See Paul D. Werner et al., Reliability, Accuracy and Decision-Making
Strategy in Clinical Predictions of Imminent Dangerousness, 51 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 815 (1983).
147. It has been reported by McNiel and Binder that violent behavior by a newly
admitted patient greatly diminishes within two days after admission into the hospital.
Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Predictive Validity of Judgments of
Dangerousnessin Emergency Civil Commitment, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 197 (1987).
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prediction of dangerousness is what Professor John Monahan
has referred to as "weak criterion variables."' 4 8 Dr. Monahan
points out that an unknown but "perhaps large" extent of violent behavior goes undetected and unreported. 1 49 Persons who
have engaged in unreported acts of violence tend to be
described as false positives when, in fact, they are true
positives.
Self-reports are one way to correct for this problem but
that approach is still in its infancy. Klassen and O'Connor
have recently found that by using patient self-reports of violent behavior
they have increased predictive accuracy by
15°
27.8%.

The use of this weak criterion variable is a particularly
severe problem in predicting the future long-term violence of
sex offenders. Newly reported evidence indicates that sex
offenders probably commit thousands of illegal sex acts that
are neither detected or reported. In an important study, Dr.
Gene Abel of Emory University Medical School and a colleague elicited hundreds of self-reports made by sex offenders
in a noncriminal setting. They reported that 503 subjects
acknowledged 62,131 "completed paraphilic acts" of pedophilia
involving 28,298 male and female victims. Another 126 subjects
reported 907 rapes involving 882 victims.' 5 ' An FBI study of
serial rapists revealed that 41 of them were responsible for at
least 837 rapes and 400 attempted rapes. 5 2 An Oregon psychologist treating 8 sex offenders, who were charged with 16
offenses and convicted of only 12, learned that they had committed over 13,000 deviant acts, including molestation and
rape.' 3 The United States Department of Justice documented
that, in 1979, 48% of all rapes and attempted rapes were not
reported. M
An important recent study, the National Women's Study,
has reported that the Department of Justice's National Crime
Victimization Survey has for years significantly under-reported
148. Monahan, supra note 133, at 253.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 253 (citing Deidre Klassen & William A. O'Connor, Predicting Violence
in Mental Patients: Cross-Validation of an Actuarial Scale (1987) (paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association)).
151. Abel & Rouleau, supra note 88, at 15.
152. Robert J. Bidinotto, Freed to Rape Again, READER'S DIGEST 53, 55 (Oct. 1991).
153. Id. at 54-55.
154. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 232 (1981).

DEP'T
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the incidence of rape.' 55 The Justice Department, for example,
estimated that in 1990 there were 130,260 rapes, a figure that
rose to 207,610 in 1991. But the National Women's Study
reported that in 1990 there were 683,000 rapes of adult women,
a figure five times as high as the Justice Department's 1990
The National Women's Study did not include
estimate."
rapes of female children and adolescents, or rapes of boys or
men. It has been suggested that this latter group might well
amount to a similar figure. If so, the total amount of rapes
would be 1,366,000.
The NWS study also reported that at least 12.1 million
women reported being forcibly raped at least once in their
lives, 61% of them as minors. The Director of the Department
of Justice's Bureau of Statistics has suggested that their lower
estimate reflected methodological differences, sample sizes,
and estimating procedures.5 7
Data like this indicate that a very large number of sex
offenses go unreported. As a result, claims of false positives, as
applied to sex offenders, may be highly exaggerated.
4.

Confusing the Individual with the Average

Even critics who accept the questionable generalization
that psychiatric predictions are highly inaccurate recognize
appreciate that there are always exceptional cases where a prediction of long-term future violence can be made with great
assurance. In any cohort of persons, there are likely to be
those at one end of the spectrum whose dangerousness is marginal and those at the other end whose dangerousness is highly
probable.
Professor Norval Morris, who has generally supported the
one-in-three proposition,"S points out that there are "a few
very rare individuals" who are obvious exceptions to the general rule. 159 It is not clear what Professor Morris means by
155. David Johnston, Survey Shows Number of Rapes Far Higher Than Official
Figures, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 24, 1992, at A9.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. "With our present knowledge, with the best possible long-term predictions of
violent behavior, we can expect to make one true positive prediction of violence to the
person for every two false positive predictions." Marc Miller & Norval Morris,
Predictionsof Dangerousness: Ethical Concerns and ProposedLimits, 2 J.L., ETHIcs &
PUB. POLICY 393, 406-07 (1986).
159. Id. at 408.
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"very rare," but it is obvious that some offenders are so clearly
dangerous by reason of their repeated acts of violence, statements about future violence, or fantasies of future violence
that ignoring their dangerousness and treating them like
"average" violent offenders would be absurd. Earl Shriner was
one such "very rare" violent offender, whose future violence
had been quite accurately predicted. The notorious Jeffrey L.
Dahmer acknowledged and was convicted of at least fifteen
killings and dismemberings of men and boys, acts which were
characterized by his defense lawyer as paraphilic acts of necrophilia, a DSM-III-R disorder. 1" Dahmer would also be one of
the exceptional cases where a prediction of future violent
behavior following several of his killings would be virtually
certain.
Whether such violent offenders are "rare," "very rare," or
simply uncommon, it is necessary to identify them. Presumably this identification is what the Washington legislature
meant by a "small but extremely dangerous" group of sexually
violent predators. Generalities do not apply to such
individuals.
5.

Applying Findings From One Cohort to a Different
Cohort

In numerous briefs and articles, the results of prediction
studies that have involved entirely different cohorts of mentally disordered persons are cited and applied to violent sex
offenders as though findings concerning the other cohorts are
equally applicable to any other mentally disordered group,
which are treated as though they were fungible.
But members of different groups of mentally disordered or
abnormal persons can have widely varying characteristics.
Persons with schizophrenia differ significantly from those with
personality disorder. Psychotic persons are not all alike.
Those with affective disorders differ from those with schizophrenic disorders. Nor are all schizophrenic persons alike.
Those who experience command hallucinations are widely
regarded as particularly dangerous. Moreover, paranoid
schizophrenics tend to be more dangerous than catatonic types
and probably should not be included with other schizophrenic
persons for purposes of studying dangerousness. John
160. Larry King Live: Justice Done-The Jeffrey Dahmer Verdict, Transcript 4981 (CNN Broadcast, Feb. 17, 1992), available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
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Monahan has called attention to the "woefully inadequate classifications of patients"'6 1 in these studies, criticizing the manner in which various types of mentally disordered persons have
been inappropriately lumped together, as though they had
common qualities and for whom predictions of violence would
be similar.
This issue should have surfaced in the Barefoot case, but
did not. Barefoot had at least two significant characteristics
not common to most cohorts of mentally disordered persons
who have been studied. First, he was diagnosed as having an
antisocial personality disorder, a diagnosis that is primarily a
history of behaviors and emotional qualities substantially dissimilar from those of psychotic persons. Second, he had committed a cold-blooded and irrational murder of a policeman
whom he had never met, motivated only by his desire to kill a
policeman for the pleasure of doing so. These two variables
alone suggest that, at the very least, studies of predictions of
the future behavior of psychopaths or of psychopathic murderers would be more applicable to Barefoot than studies of
psychotic persons and that studies of psychotics might say very
little about the accuracy of a prediction about a psychopath
like Barefoot. Similarly, a study of predictions about schizophrenic persons with command hallucinations to kill might be
more revealing than generalized studies of schizophrenic
patients who do not have such hallucinations. Of course, it is
not morally or legally feasible to make such a study by releasing those who have such hallucinations, making a prediction of
dangerousness, then determining the extent of false positives!
Applying the results of inapplicable studies to predictions
concerning violent sex offenders is highly questionable.
Unlike many other mentally disordered persons, violent sex
offenders are compulsive in their need to commit offenses that
provide them with gratification. Many pedophiles, for example, are notoriously unable to change. Statistics indicate that
they act out obsessively and often in situations in which they
put themselves at great risk. Studies also show a high rate of
recidivism among certain sex offenders. For example, a 1989
times
federal study has found that released rapists are 10.5
1 62
rape.
for
rearrested
be
to
nonrapists
than
more likely
161. Monahan, supra note 133, at 252.
162. ALLEN J. BECK & BERNARD E. SHIPLEY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SPECIAL REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 at 2 (1989).
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Variations in the Definition of Dangerousness

A final problem in gauging the validity of research is the
extent to which definitions of dangerousness used by clinicians
whose predictions are being studied are similar or dissimilar
from the definition used by the researcher. The clinician may
have had a broad definition that includes as dangerous such
items as verbal behavior, actions against property, threats, and
the like, leading to a larger number of predictions of dangerousness, whereas the researcher may have used a narrow definition of dangerousness, limited to subsequent physically
violent behavior. If so, the proportion of false positives attributed to the clinician would increase, not because the clinician
predicted wrongly, but because he predicted differently, using
different criteria.
The clinician may also have believed that, in cases where
to others was great, a one-in-three or fifty-fifty likelirisk
the
hood justified a prediction of dangerousness, which would lead
to confinement or retention, often on a short-term basis. The
clinician need not have believed that the likelihood of violent
behavior was one hundred percent. If so, the fact that two out
of three or one out of two did not later engage in violent
behavior does not indicate that the clinician was wrong. His
approach to dangerousness may have incorporated a complex
definition that anticipated and took account of potential
error. 1 63

B. Actuarial Bases of Prediction
Although the terms of the SVP statute do not require that
the SVP be a recidivistic sex offender, it is likely, because of
the attorney general's guidelines, that most, if not all, offenders proposed for civil commitment will be offenders who have
in fact engaged in repeated violent sexual offenses. Among the
considerations recommended by the Washington Attorney
General for filing against an offender is a "provable pattern of
prior predatory acts."'" Earl Shriner had committed numerous sex offenses over a long career. Young and Cunningham,
the two petitioners in the case currently testing the constitutionality of the statute, are multiple rapists.
163. For a discussion of definitions of dangerousness, see Alexander D. Brooks,

Defining the Dangerousness of the Mentally IL Involuntary Civil Commitment, in
MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDERS 280-307 (Michael Craft et al. eds., 1984).
164. See Tweten, supra note 17.
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It is a well accepted view that offenders who have committed a succession of violent acts are, with each act, increasingly
likely to reoffend violently. Dr. Saleem Shah has reported the
results of a District of Columbia study, stating that the likelihood of a new offense "approached certainty" after five or
more arrests.'6 Nigel Walker and colleagues studied a cohort
of violent first offenders in Glasgow. By the time these offenders reached their third and subsequent conviction, the likelihood that they would commit another one had gone up to
approximately sixty percent. 16 G.C.N. Hall, in a 1988 study of
convicted sex offenders, found that a past history of sexual
offending against adults was the best actuarial predictor of
future sexual crimes.167 Emory Hodges has reported that, in
the case of convicted sex offenders released from treatment
programs against staff advice, eighty-one percent committed
new offenses within three years. 68
Such actuarial data seems to be reasonably accurate in
identifying persons who will engage in future violent acts. But
there is a general reluctance to rely exclusively on actuarial
data. Some commentators have argued that a combination of
clinical and actuarial data appears to be the best approach to
69
predict future sexual violence.
C. The Recent Overt Act Requirement
Finally, we can deal summarily with the argument that
the statute is flawed because it fails to require evidence of a
"recent overt act" of violence in order to make a finding that
an individual is a sexually violent predator. The recent overt
act formula originated as an evidentiary requirement in civil
commitment cases that was expected to lend accuracy to a clinically based prediction of future dangerousness. In theory, this
165. The PROMIS research project in the District of Columbia found that "if a
defendant had five or more arrests prior to the current arrest, the probability of a
subsequent arrest began to approach certainty." Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousnessand
Mental Illness: Some Conceptua4 Prediction, and Policy Dilemmas, in DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN LAw AND MENTAL HEALTH 153, 186 n.3 (Calvin J. Frederick

ed., 1978).
166. Nigel Walker et al., Repeated Violence, 1967 CRIM. L. REV. 465.
167. Gordon C. Nagayama Hall, CriminalBehavior as a Function of Clinical and
Actuarial Variables in a Sexual Offender Population, 56 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL
PSYCHOL. 773 (1988).
168. Emory F. Hodges, Crime Prevention by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 128
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 291 (1971).
169. See Litwack et al., supra note 133.
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requirement would add an objective factual basis to what was
perceived at the time as an otherwise dubious subjective
prediction.
However, such a statutory requirement would be inappropriate in the SVP statute for at least two reasons. First, in
most cases under the statute, the sex offender presented for
commitment would have been in prison with little or no opportunity to commit an overt sexually violent act, especially one
involving a child. If there were such a requirement, most sex
offenders would not meet it and therefore could not be committed. The requirement would thus defeat the very purpose
of the act.
Second, the requirement in fact has little value in further
validating clinical predictions. In Mathew v. Nelson, 7 ° a threejudge federal court was confronted with the question whether
the Illinois civil commitment statute should be interpreted as
requiring a recent overt act. The court held an evidentiary
hearing at which the parties presented four experts on dangerousness to help the court decide the question. 7 ' All four
experts, two for the petitioner-patient and two for the State,
agreed that evidence of one recent overt act adds little or nothing to the accuracy of a dangerousness prediction. 7 2 This
would be particularly the case for long-term predictions.
Thus, the requirement would do little to protect the sex
offender but would tend to ham-string the legislation.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Of all of the many criticisms that have been made of the
SVP statute, the two most formidable ones are, first, that sex
offenders are being held in a "treatment" program that is
spurious and, second, that many "innocent" offenders who
have "paid their debt" to society will be confined needlessly.
The program is criticized as spurious because no known
treatment for violent sex offenders appears to be efficacious.
Yet it should be clear from the findings of the legislature that
incapacitation is the principal function of the program, not
treatment. Treatment is offered because of a recognition that
to provide treatment in good faith, whether effective or not,
may be constitutionally required and is morally necessary.
170. 461 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Il. 1978).
171. Id. at 708.
172. Id. at 710.
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Supporters of the statute regard confinement with treatment
in the civil commitment process, however questionable as to
results, as better than confinement without treatment in
prison through the criminal process. But the bottom line is
that, whether treatment works or not, the U.S. Supreme Court
has constitutionally validated confinement that is designed to
protect society against mentally abnormal dangerous persons.
The second major criticism is that, inasmuch as predicting
dangerousness is "impossible," a significant number of "false
positives" or "innocent" persons will be confined on the basis
of inaccurate predictions of future violent behavior. But inasmuch as longer prison sentences and habitual offender statutes
also rest on predictions of dangerousness, the same constitutional and moral argument could be made against such sentencing approaches, which seem to be approved by critics of
the SVP statute as alternatives to it.
As I have indicated, the charge of inaccuracy of prediction
in the context of sex offenses is almost surely overdrawn.
Empirical studies relied on by critics of the SVP statute are
now recognized as seriously flawed and their conclusions
highly questionable. The least we can say about these
researches is that their major conclusion that psychiatrists
make two inaccurate predictions of future dangerousness for
every correct one has not been adequately demonstrated. The
most we can say is that, in respect of predictions of sexual violence, a great deal of newly published data tends to support the
proposition that accurate predictions of future violent sexual
crimes can probably be made in at least fifty percent of many
cases, with a higher percentage of accuracy in others. This
proposition is especially likely where there is a record of
repeated violent sexual offenses, which is probably the case
with most offenders committed under the SVP statute because
of the attorney general's guidelines.
But it is myopic to focus too intensely on quantitative data.
The issue is one of balancing values. An argument that
emphasizes false positives to the exclusion of concern about
the grave harms caused to potential victims by violent sexual
offenders obscures the fact that, in deciding whether to accept
predictions of future sexual violence, it is necessary to strike a
balance between the risk to the offender of a mistake made
when we confine him if he is nondangerous and the risk that,
if we release him, he will later engage in violent sexual crimes.
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A question not typically asked is whether we are imposing a
potential great risk of harm to innocent women and children
who are the typical victims of these offenders when we try to
avoid false positives.
Let us make the reasonable assumption that the risk of a
false positive in predicting future sexual violence is approximately 50%. Let us further suppose that we are deciding the
disposition of two already convicted sex offenders, now about
to be released from prison, one of whom will and one of whom
will not commit a violent sexual crime in the future. These
two offenders have similar records and psychological profiles.
We do not know which of the two will offend if both are not
confined.
We have only two options: to release both or confine both.
If we focus predominantly on false positives we will
release both men because we regard it as unjust to confine the
one potentially nondangerous offender. But we can be confident that the other man will sexually victimize non-blameworthy persons in a violent way. We will have imposed the risk of
violence on innocent persons.
On the other hand, if we confine both offenders, we mistakenly detain one, but that person is already an offender who
has been convicted of at least one pathological, violent sex
offense and usually more. That offender is far from "innocent," and he will receive treatment.
In an ideal world neither choice is desirable. We would
prefer not to make any mistakes at all. But given real-world
imperfections of knowledge, mistakes are inevitable. These
mistakes are regrettable, but it certainly is not constitutionally
wrong to mistakenly confine some presumably nondangerous
offenders on the basis of an imperfect prediction. We do it all
the time. Is it morally wrong to make such a mistake? Which
mistake is more harmful in its consequence to societal values?
A mistaken decision to confine, however painful to the
offender involved, is, in my view, simply not morally
equivalent to a mistaken decision to release. There is a significant difference between the two. One is much less harmful
than the other.
Libertarians who focus exclusively, or heavily, on the
injustice being done to a mistakenly confined offender tend to
place less significance on the harms caused by the alternative
decision, to the extent that they consider them at all. We have
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been socialized to emphasize injustices to offenders. We have
not been sufficiently sensitive to the harm inflicted by sex
offenders, especially violent rapists and violent child abusers.
But this emphasis is changing. Today, in part because of the
activities of feminist and victims' movements, greater attention
is being paid to the harm done to female and child victims of
sexual crimes. Moreover, addditional information is being
revealed today about the nature and extent of serious sexual
crimes than has been disclosed in the past. These considerations should be reflected in weighing the rights of victims of
sex crimes in the balance as against offenders' rights.
Washington's SVP statute is a modest attempt to use the
civil commitment model to correct for gaps and errors that
may have occurred in the criminal process. It results in the
confinement of a very small cohort of offenders. If properly
administered, it should be found not only constitutionally valid
but also morally acceptable.

